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Abstract 
In light of recent criticisms of the concept of human dignity, this contribution 
offers a proposal for the continued relevance of the concept for tertiary chaplaincy. 
It is important to consider the concept of human dignity in tertiary chaplaincy 
because: many higher education institutions continue to identify human dignity as 
a key value; the kinds of ethical issues that tertiary students face will often involve 
appeals to human dignity; and the religious connotations that have come to be 
associated with the concept fall within the scope of chaplains.  Nevertheless, there 
have been recent calls for the concept of human dignity to be dismissed from 
ethical discourse as unhelpful. In ethical debate, dignity can be unhelpful when it 
leads   to  ‘dignity   talk’,  when   there   is  disagreement  about  whether  it   is  something  
human beings always already have or something that is realised through human 
activity, or when it conceals what people think is really at stake. In response to 
these criticisms, this contribution proposes a model for understanding human 
dignity that  affirms the value of the human person as a multi-dimensional, 
historically-situated being in relationship to all that is, a being who is faced with 
difficult moral choices through which he or she makes meaning in his or her life. 
This model has both descriptive value in helping us to understand why people do 
what they do, and normative value in helping us evaluate what should be done. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Human dignity has become a familiar term in contemporary discourse, and it is likely that most 
people who use it have some idea of what they think it means. Yet, the winds of change may be upon 
us with respect to the widespread use of the concept of human dignity. Serious challenges have been 
posed to the usefulness of the concept of human dignity for contemporary ethics, and whether gentle 
breeze or gale force polemic, these criticisms cannot be taken lightly.  
 
                                                          
1 David  Kirchhoffer  teaches  theological  ethics  at  Australian  Catholic  University’s  Brisbane  Campus.  He  obtained  his  
doctorate from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium. His primary research interests include theological 
anthropology and the relevance and meaning of the concept of human dignity for contemporary ethics. Email: 
David.Kirchhoffer@acu.edu.au 
 
2 
 
Therefore, this contribution will consider the efficacy of the concept of human dignity for 
contemporary  tertiary  chaplaincy  in  three  steps.  First,  we’ll  explore  some  of  the  reasons  why  it  might  
be important for chaplains working in the tertiary sector to reflect on the concept of human dignity. 
Second,  we’ll  take  a  closer  look  at  these  winds  of  change  that  are  gaining  strength  with  regard  to  the  
use of the concept of human dignity in ethical discourse, and their potential impact on chaplaincy 
work. Finally, this contribution will propose one way to revitalise our understanding of human dignity 
that does not so much oppose the winds of change but rather sees them as an opportunity to build 
wind farms that turn human dignity into a useful, and sustainable, concept for ethical discourse—a 
concept that is of both descriptive and normative value to our ethical reflection.  
  
 
1. DIGNITY IN TERTIARY CHAPLAINCY 
The following considers the role of the concept of human dignity in contemporary tertiary chaplaincy 
from three perspectives: the official discourse of tertiary institutions, student experience, and the 
concept’s  religious  connotations. 
 
Official Discourse 
Human dignity should be a relevant concept to those working in tertiary chaplaincy because 
universities themselves often appeal to it, be this in learning outcomes, graduate attributes, mission 
statements, or policy documents.  
 
Australian Catholic University (ACU), for instance, as one might expect from an explicitly Catholic 
tertiary institution, mentions human dignity in official discourse on numerous occasions. For example, 
the  first  of  its  graduate  attributes  is  to  “demonstrate  respect  for  the  dignity  of  each  individual  and  for  
human  diversity.”  The  university  counts  “promotion  of  ...  the  dignity  of  the  human  person”  among  the  
key values that drive  its  educational  philosophy,  and,  in  its  mission  statement,  ACU  states  that  “In  its  
endeavours, it is guided by a fundamental concern for justice and equity, and the dignity of all human 
beings”  (Australian  Catholic  University  2012).   
 
The point is that in the tertiary education context, like many other contexts, it is claimed that the 
notion of human dignity should play a pivotal, if not indeed foundational role in our ethical and moral 
formation and discourse. This is most evident when one considers how central the notion of human 
dignity appears to be in international human rights discourse, as demonstrated by Article 1 of the 
United  Nations’  1948  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights:  “All  human  beings  are  born  free  and  
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another  in  a  spirit  of  brotherhood.”   
 
Student Experience 
In  addition  to  the  ‘official’  status  of  human  dignity,  there  is  a  second  reason  that  the  concept  of  human  
dignity may be important in tertiary chaplaincy. Many of the encounters that chaplains have with 
students are encounters focussed on issues of morality and the particular moral and ethical challenges 
that students may be facing in their own lives (Clifford 2006).  
 
These moral issues,   and   this   is   not   surprising   given   human   dignity’s   status   in   the   aforementioned  
‘official’   discourse,   may   well   be   peppered   with   references   to   human   dignity.   Situations   involving  
unexpected pregnancy, or ailing or seriously ill friends or relatives, are obvious examples that might 
lead students to ask moral questions in which the language of human dignity might come into play. 
Yet, when one considers the many changes that are taking place in student life—for example, the fact 
that increasing numbers of students are combining work and study, or that an increasing number of 
students   in  Australian  universities  don’t   come   from  Australia   (James  et   al.   2010)—then there are a 
wide variety of moral spaces in which the concept of human dignity may be invoked. Consider issues, 
for example, of harassment, bullying, or discrimination in the workplace or society at large (or indeed 
in the tertiary institution itself) on gender, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.  
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Religious Connotations 
Which brings us to a third reason why the concept of human dignity might be important in the context 
of tertiary chaplaincy, namely, that it is, for many religious people, an articulation of the belief that all 
human beings are created and loved by God.  This is evident, for example, in the strong connection in 
Roman Catholic writings, both official and otherwise, between the concept of human dignity and the 
idea that human beings are created in the image of God (see, for example, the Second Vatican 
Council’s   1965   Pastoral   Constitution on the Church in the Modern World—Gaudium et spes). In 
Islam, too, human dignity is an absolute value applicable to all human beings, who are a manifestation 
of  God’s  will  (Pal  2011).   
 
In other words, in religious settings, it is almost impossible to separate the belief in the dignity of 
every human individual from the implicit or explicit belief that God loves human beings. Thus, even 
though encounters in chaplaincy may not always be explicitly religious, insofar as the concept of 
human dignity has become embroiled in strongly religiously-coloured ethical debates—for example, 
those surrounding abortion and end-of-life decisions—it is almost impossible to avoid at the very least 
religious overtones in these discussions.  
 
Therefore, human dignity is an important concept for tertiary chaplaincy because it is a defining 
feature of much of the official discourse of contemporary society, because this in turn means that the 
concept is likely to come up in one way or another in the kinds of ethical issues about which students 
might want to talk to chaplains, and finally because the connection of human dignity to religious 
concepts, both in official and public discourse (for example, on the internet), means that any 
discussion of human dignity in the context of chaplaincy is likely to be interpreted by the students, or 
those they tell, as implicitly reflecting faith convictions. This may, of course, be both a barrier and an 
opening for further discussion.  
 
 
2.  ‘DIGNITY  IS  A  USELESS CONCEPT’:  THE  WIND  OF  CHANGE? 
It is precisely the growing awareness that the invocation of the concept of human dignity in ethical 
discourse  can  be  a  barrier  to  meaningful  discussion  that  has  led  in  recent  years  to  a  ‘wind  of  change’  
in dignity discourse. Though there may be some degree of general agreement as to what human 
dignity might mean, there would seem to be sufficient differences in interpretation to warrant a call by 
some critics to have the concept of human dignity banished from our ethical discourse. Moreover, 
once one starts to apply the concept and actually use it in ethical situations, one starts to encounter the 
real challenges: one discovers that whilst most people might agree that human dignity should be 
respected, when it comes to concrete ethical debate, there is often disagreement.  
 
This has led several scholars, particularly those working in the field of bioethics, to criticise the 
concept of human dignity as useless, vacuous, and indeed even stupid (Macklin 2003, Bagaric & 
Allan 2006, Pinker 2008)—or, as I have rather provocatively put it in the title of this contribution, as 
just hot air. From once being the bastion of ethical arguments, as illustrated in the earlier reference to 
human   dignity’s   foundational   position   in   the   Universal   Declaration of Human Rights, there are a 
growing number of critical voices that are calling for its dismissal because of the confusion it 
apparently causes, and because of its alleged inefficacy in resolving ethical debates.  
 
These criticisms should be taken seriously. Three problems stand out due to the likelihood of their 
coming to the fore when human dignity is invoked in chaplaincy contexts, particularly when students 
are seeking guidance on the kinds of ethical issues described already.  
 
The Problem of  ‘Dignity  Talk’ 
The   first   and  most  glaring  problem   is  what   I   have   termed   ‘dignity   talk’.  Dignity   talk   is  where   two  
opposing sides of an ethical dispute both appeal to the concept of human dignity to underpin their 
claims, and moreover, they make this appeal in a manner in which human dignity is not so much an 
argument, but a weapon with which to bludgeon the opposition into submission, an argument-ending, 
self-evident, normative trump card!  
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This was demonstrated to me again recently in one of the ethics classes I teach. The students had been 
set a task that centred around an online discussion of whether or not, as Peter Singer has suggested, all 
Australians should donate five per cent of their income to a charity that serves to meet the most basic 
needs of those living in extreme poverty in other parts of the world (Singer 2009). What was 
interesting about this task is that they were asked to explain their position using a theory of values. 
The   class   preceding   the   discussion   had   addressed   Daniel   Sulmasy’s ideas regarding a theory of 
values, and in particular the idea of the intrinsic value of human beings per se, for which Sulmasy 
reserves the term Dignity with a capital D (Sulmasy 2010). What was fascinating was that whilst most 
of the students could see the point that children in Africa could be said to have dignity (or Dignity) as 
some intrinsic value, when it came to suggesting that relatively affluent Australians should therefore 
be compelled by law, out of respect for this dignity, to donate to charities that provide basic goods, 
that save lives through provision of clean drinking water, or vaccines, or medical care, or food, or 
education and so on, they were quick to say that this would not be a good idea because it would 
diminish the goodness of the charitable act for the giver. It would be an offence to the intrinsic value 
of  the  giver’s  happiness.  The  giver  would  no  longer  be  able  to  feel  good  about  him- or herself, and, 
therefore, concluded the students, charitable donations should remain voluntary. Yet, many of these 
are the very same students who would oppose abortion or physician-assisted suicide on the grounds 
that to allow these would be an offence to human dignity. Moreover, they would argue that the law 
must legislate to save the lives of human beings who have intrinsic worth, dignity, as human beings 
per se in these cases. Nonetheless, they opposed such legal enforcement of actions that would save 
lives in Africa on the grounds that this would diminish their dignity as givers by compelling them, 
rather than allowing them to freely choose, to engage in good works. 
 
Dignity is not only used as a sort of debate ending trump card. When one starts to interrogate what 
people in these contexts actually mean by human dignity one discovers that they don’t  always  agree.   
 
Human Dignity: Something We Have Or Something We Acquire? 
The first problem encountered upon interrogating the use of human dignity in contemporary discourse 
is two distinctly different uses of human dignity. On the hand, there is the idea of human dignity as 
some sort of inherent worth, some sort of always already present and inviolable value that inheres in 
every  human  person  (Sulmasy’s  ‘Dignity’).  It  is  something  that  all  human  persons  already  have  and  it  
cannot be taken away. Moreover, it is supposedly inviolable. This is typical of many of the more 
explicitly religious understandings of human dignity (Sulmasy, for example, is a Catholic Franciscan 
Friar as well as a medical doctor). It is arguably what the students just mentioned, following 
Sulmasy’s  lead,  had  in  mind  when  they  affirmed  that  children  in  Africa  do  have  dignity.   
 
This can be contrasted with an understanding of dignity as something to aspire to, to obtain, the end or 
fulfilment of our humanity. We talk about living with dignity, for example, or deserving to be treated 
with dignity. This is not necessarily about dignitaries, or the idea that dignity only inheres in people of 
a particular class, although that too is not unrelated. What is in play here is rather an experiential, 
psychological understanding of human dignity as a kind of pride or sense of self-worth, such that a 
perceived  offence  to  one’s  dignity  is  not  an  offence  to  some  abstract  notion  of  one’s  intrinsic  worth,  
but  much  more  to  one’s  concrete  self-perception as worthy, as having dignity (Gilligan 1997). In the 
example above, this is what the students seemed to mean when they resisted the suggestion that the 
five per cent donation should be obligatory. Their self-fulfilment, their sense of self-worth, would be 
diminished if they were forced to do something, rather than freely chose to do it because they thought 
it was the morally right and good thing to do.  
 
This means that if an ethically useful concept of human dignity is to be defended, either it must be 
shown that one of these conceptions is false, or an account of how human dignity can be both 
something we already have and something that we seek to acquire must be developed. 
 
The third challenge, and perhaps the most challenging—because, potentially we could cope by just 
always explicitly making a distinction between the dignity we have and the dignity we acquire when 
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we use dignity in those different senses—is that there really is no such thing as human dignity after 
all.  
There Is No Such Thing as Human Dignity    
By interrogating what people really mean when they appeal to human dignity in a fashion consistent 
with  what  I  have  described  as  ‘dignity  talk’,  one  might  conclude  that  the  concept  of  human  dignity  is  
really just a façade, and that human dignity, because it is a term seemingly endowed with a mysterious 
normative power thanks to its inclusion in human rights documents, is in fact really just representing 
another claim, such that when one argues for a particular course of action based on respect for human 
dignity, one indeed means something else. If we consider again the case of the students, it might be 
far more accurate to suggest that they oppose abortion and physician-assisted suicide based on a belief 
that it would be an offence not to human beings but to God the giver of life. In other words, it is not 
human  dignity  that  is  at  stake,  but  God’s  dignity.  And  it  might,  therefore,  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  
they oppose legislation that compels them to give to charity because this would undermine their 
autonomy, which is essential to their sense of self-worth as morally good beings. In other words, 
sometimes,  especially  in  public  discourse,  when  people  say  ‘respect  human  dignity’  they  really  mean  
respect autonomy, or respect physical human life, or respect my belief that God made me, or respect 
my desire to be respected. When that is the case, then Ruth Macklin (2003) may be right, human 
dignity may be useless because it masks what people think is really at stake.   
 
Thus, an adequate defence of the concept of human dignity will have to show that human dignity 
cannot simply be reduced to one or other feature of the human person. Moreover, it will have to 
demonstrate that the concept offers something more to ethics than any of the individual features, such 
as autonomy, alone.  
 
To conclude this section, it must be affirmed that there is a problem. The way in which human dignity 
is frequently used in contemporary ethical discourse—the rise of dignity talk— is a problem because 
it means we are more often faced with unconstructive shouting matches than with genuinely clear and 
constructive ethical argumentation.  
 
What this contribution proposes is a model that overcomes the challenges that have been raised. It is a 
model that offers us a way to think of human dignity as grounded not in one or other feature of the 
human person, nor indeed in the idea that we are made in the image of God, although this still remains 
a helpful idea, but precisely as referring to the value of the human person as a multi-dimensional, 
historically-situated being in relationship to all that is, a being who is faced with difficult moral 
choices through which they make meaning in their lives. 
 
 
3. THE COMPONENT DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN DIGNITY MODEL 
The following demonstrates how this model, which has already been developed in detail elsewhere 
(Kirchhoffer 2009, 2013), makes the concept of human dignity valuable for both descriptive and 
normative ethics. This will be done with reference to the case of a convicted criminal who violently 
and repeatedly attacked guards and fellow inmates, no matter what punishment he was given for it 
(Gilligan 1997).  
 
This man justified his violent behaviour by stating that he had to defend his dignity and he would kill 
whomever he had to in order to do so (Gilligan 1997). The first task of ethics, at the descriptive level, 
is to understand why this man does what he does. This aspect is arguably very important in the 
context of chaplaincy, or indeed any counselling role. We must first understand why people do what 
they do if we are going to avoid the trap of moralistic judgment. The second, the normative level, is to 
determine whether he is right or wrong to do so. One should not just dismiss the concept of human 
dignity because this man uses it to justify violence. One should see his self-justification as an 
invitation to begin to do ethics, to begin to try to understand what he means by human dignity and 
how this affects his moral behaviour.  Then, at the normative level of ethics, one can begin to evaluate 
his understanding and his behaviour. 
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Table 1. The Component Dimensions of Human Dignity 
Component Dimension Already Not Yet 
Existential Have (Potential) Acquire (Fulfilment) 
Cognitive Inherent Worth Self-Worth 
Behavioural Moral Good Morally Good 
Social Others’  Dignity My Dignity  
 
 
Descriptive Level One: What does he think human dignity is? 
First, in order to understand why this man does what he does, we can ask what he thinks human 
dignity is. According to the model, at an EXISTENTIAL level, human dignity is something that all 
human beings always ALREADY have. They have it because, as human beings, they all have a share 
in a given set of capacities, like reason, love, free choice and so on. Yet, at the same time, the very 
nature of these capacities makes human beings thinking, feeling, acting subjects. Consequently, 
human beings naturally desire to realise the potential INHERENT in these capacities as a sense of 
SELF WORTH. They want to consciously (thinking) feel good (feeling) about themselves (subjects) 
and take pride in the lives they lead (acting). They want to fulfil their potential. The alternative is 
alienation (a loss of a sense of being a subject), meaninglessness (a lack of any sufficient reason for 
existence), and despair (a feeling that leads ultimately to a cessation of action). This is illustrated by 
the way in which the students mentioned above felt that to make charitable donations compulsory by 
law would remove the meaningfulness of the use of their capacities for morally good ends, in this case 
acting for the good of the dignity of starving children in Africa.  
 
These capacities, however, as well as the fact that human beings are each historically situated in a 
unique set of relationships, mean that they may all have slightly different ideas about what constitutes 
a  dignified  life,  which  determines  the  kind  of  ‘good’  life  they  aspire to. It was interesting to note, in 
this  regard,  that  not  only  did  the  students  feel  they  shouldn’t  be  compelled  to  give,  but  also  that  they  
should be allowed to choose which cause they would support. In other words, whilst acknowledging 
the needs of children in Africa, they argued that they felt it would be more worthy to support flood 
victims in Brisbane. In the case of the violent man, he equates dignity with a sense of self-worth that 
is dependent on the respect he feels (hence, it is part of the Cognitive-Affective Component 
Dimension) others show him. In his case, he only feels he is respected if he perceives others as fearing 
him.  
 
 
 
Descriptive Level Two: What shapes his understanding of human dignity? 
Second, having answered what he thinks dignity is, we can ask, still at the descriptive level, what 
social influences, mores, and circumstances might contribute to his understanding of dignity? Being 
ALREADY always historically situated means that human beings learn their ideas of what dignity is, 
and of what constitutes a dignified, respectful, and meaningful existence, from their interactions with 
others, and with the concrete moral norms of their society and its institutions. In the case of the 
students, they may think it un-Australian not to give help to fellow Australians. In the case of the 
violent  man,  he  may  have  grown  up  in  an  honour  culture.  In  an  honour  culture  a  man’s  dignity  (his  
worth) is equated with his ability to defend his honour in the face of insult or humiliation. It is a 
culture in which to live without this kind of respect is to live in shame—a life not worth living— and 
a  culture  in  which  justice  often  means  violently  punishing  or  shaming  those  who  offend  one’s  honour,  
one’s  sense  of  dignity  (Gilligan  1997).   
 
Descriptive Level Three: How does he use this understanding to rationalise his acts? 
Our  third,  descriptive  question  is  how  does  this  man’s  understanding  of  human  dignity  enable  him  to  
rationalise and justify his behaviour, in this case, violently attacking other people? At the level of the 
BEHAVIOURAL Component Dimension, the link between dignity and moral behaviour, is that 
human beings acquire dignity (their sense of Self-Worth), through MORALLY GOOD 
BEHAVIOUR. We applaud all behaviour that we consider to be morally good and, in doing so, we 
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confer dignity on the morally good person. For example, we think of Mother Teresa or Nelson 
Mandela as having dignity, not by virtue of their status but by virtue of the moral goodness we see 
them as having embodied, and hence realised, through their behaviour.  In the case of the violent man, 
we have said that there is a norm in his culture that considers it morally good and just to punish 
violently  those  who  offend  one’s  dignity.  The  result  is  that  he  tries  to  realise  his  dignity,  his  sense  of  
self-worth as a meaningful human being, through behaviour that he believes to be morally good, or at 
the very least, morally justifiable. 
 
The advantage of this descriptive analysis is that it helps us to avoid a moralistic condemnation of the 
man as simply evil. It makes it more difficult to demonise him. This is important because, otherwise, 
it  becomes  possible  to  say  that  the  ‘demon’  has  no  dignity.  Yet,  we  have  already  affirmed  that  every  
human being, including this man, still has a basic inherent dignity that rests in his or her potential to 
lead a morally meaningful life in relationship with others.  Therefore, instead of demonising him, we 
are able to recognise him as a human being like us, struggling with his existential situatedness and 
seeking to give meaning to his life. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we have to condone what he 
does. 
 
This is where the normative level of the Component Dimensions of Human Dignity model comes into 
play. This model can be used not only to understand his moral behaviour but also to critique his 
beliefs and behaviour.  
 
The Normative Level  
The  first  problem  is  that  this  man’s  understanding  of  dignity  is  purely  egotistical.  He  ignores  the  fact  
that dignity, properly understood, is multi-dimensional, like the human being. Thus, human dignity 
also refers to the INHERENT WORTH of all human beings. This inherent worth is a MORAL 
GOOD. That means it is an end in itself. The reason for this is that without it, none of the rest makes 
sense. It is only because we are human beings, already possessing a range of capacities, that it is even 
possible for us to conceive of our own dignity, or to desire a sense of self-worth or to engage in moral 
behaviour.  
 
The second major problem is that he attempts to secure his dignity (MY DIGNITY) by diminishing or 
destroying the dignity of others (their INHERENT WORTH which is a MORAL GOOD). Therefore, 
because he destroys rather than pursues a moral good, namely the inherent worth of others, his 
behaviour cannot be said to be MORALLY GOOD. Thus, it cannot confer true dignity (which is seen 
to be realised through morally good behaviour). His understanding of human dignity and the 
behaviour that it justifies are ultimately self-defeating, because they result in a vicious, self-deceptive, 
moralistic cycle. In other words, his vision and behaviour are in contravention of the Social 
Component Dimension. The Social Component Dimension holds that MY DIGNITY (our dignity) 
can  only  truly  be  realised  when  everyone’s  (OTHERS’)  dignity  is  realised,  that  is,  when  everyone  has  
realised their own sense of self-worth in a way that affirms the dignity of others. And that ideal is 
obviously NOT YET the case.  
 
 
4. THE ALREADY AND THE NOT YET 
Finally, a word on the notion of the Already and the Not Yet. The fact that the fullness of dignity has 
not yet been realised for everyone also serves a critical function. It stands as a caveat to the 
ideological certainties that human beings are so easily seduced into believing. It is a warning that 
reminds us that our humanity, though dignified, is nevertheless flawed, not only because it is always 
already conditioned by a particular historical situatedness, but also because, in the pursuit of the 
universal ideal of dignity, we are always in danger of being too sure that we have found the ultimate 
way to bring the Not Yet to fruition.  Thus,  it  represents  an  ‘eschatological  proviso’  (Metz  1968)  that  
says that as we work to realise our own dignity and the dignity of others, we should do so humbly in 
the hope that the means we choose to reach our end are indeed worthy of the end we seek to attain. In 
the  words  of  the  prophet  Micah,  “He  has  told  you,  O mortal, what is good; and what does the Lord 
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require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?”   (6:8,  
NRSV).  
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